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Generic uniqueness of the bias vector of mean payoff zero-sum games
Marianne Akian, Ste´phane Gaubert and Antoine Hochart
Abstract— Zero-sum mean payoff games can be studied by
means of a nonlinear spectral problem. When the state space is
finite, the latter consists in finding an eigenpair (u, λ) solution
of T (u) = λ1+u where T : Rn → Rn is the Shapley (dynamic
programming) operator, λ is a scalar, 1 is the unit vector,
and u ∈ Rn. The scalar λ yields the mean payoff per time
unit, and the vector u, called the bias, allows one to determine
optimal stationary strategies. The existence of the eigenpair
(u, λ) is generally related to ergodicity conditions. A basic issue
is to understand for which classes of games the bias vector is
unique (up to an additive constant). In this paper, we consider
perfect information zero-sum stochastic games with finite state
and action spaces, thinking of the transition payments as
variable parameters, transition probabilities being fixed. We
identify structural conditions on the support of the transition
probabilities which guarantee that the spectral problem is
solvable for all values of the transition payments. Then, we show
that the bias vector, thought of as a function of the transition
payments, is generically unique (up to an additive constant).
The proof uses techniques of max-plus (tropical) algebra and
nonlinear Perron-Frobenius theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The mean payoff of a repeated game
Zero-sum repeated games describe long term interactions
between two agents (called players) with opposite interests.
We consider here perfect information games, in which each
of the players chooses alternatively an action, being informed
of the current state of the game and of the previous actions of
the other player. These choices determine an instantaneous
payment, as well as the next state, either by a deterministic
or a stochastic process. We refer the reader to [1] for
background on repeated games and stochastic games.
A zero-sum repeated stochastic game with perfect infor-
mation is composed of
– a state space S.
– an action space Ai ⊂ A for player MIN, depending on
i ∈ S, and included in a given set A; at each stage, player
MIN chooses an action a ∈ Ai knowing the current state i
and the past states and actions of both players.
– an action space Bi,a ⊂ B for player MAX, depending on
i ∈ S and on a ∈ Ai, and included in a given set B; at each
stage, player MAX chooses an action b ∈ Bi,a, knowing the
current state i, the last action a ∈ Ai chosen by player MIN
and the past states and actions of both players.
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– a transition payment rabi ∈ R paid by player MIN to player
MAX at each stage, given the current state i ∈ S and the last
actions of each of the players a ∈ Ai and b ∈ Bi,a.
– a transition probability P abi ∈ ∆(S), depending on the
same data, where ∆(S) is the set of probabilities over S;
when in state i ∈ S, if the actions a, b have been played, the
next state is chosen according to the probability P abi .
The game is said to be deterministic if each transition
probability P abi has only one state in its support, meaning
that for every choice of i ∈ S, a ∈ Ai, and b ∈ Bi,a, we have
Pi({j}) = 1 for precisely one state j ∈ S. Given the above
parameters, and a strategy of each player (that is a selection
rule for the sequence of actions at each step of the game), the
payoff of the game is an additive function of the transition
payments, that player MIN intends to minimize and player
MAX intends to maximize. In particular, the game with a
fixed finite horizon k consists of k successive alternated
moves of the players MIN and MAX, with a payoff
Jki = E
[
k−1∑
ℓ=0
rαℓβℓξℓ
]
, (1)
where E denotes the expectation for the probability law of the
process (ξℓ, αℓ, βℓ)ℓ≥0 of state and actions of players MIN
and MAX respectively, determined by the above transition
probabilities and the strategies, given the initial state i.
Throughout the paper, we make the following assump-
tions:
Assumption A (finite state and action spaces):
i) The state space S is finite, say S = {1, . . . , n}.
ii) All the action spaces Ai and Bi,a are nonempty finite
sets.
The analysis of the above game involves the Shapley
operator T : Rn → Rn, which is such that, for all x =
(xi)i∈S ,
[T (x)]i = min
a∈Ai
max
b∈Bi,a
(
rabi + P
ab
i x
)
, (2)
for all states i ∈ S. Note that Assumption A implies that the
min and max in (2) are always attained. Also, the elements
P of ∆(S) are seen as row vectors, P = (Pj)j∈S , so that
Px means
∑n
j=1 Pjxj .
Given an initial state i ∈ S, the game in horizon k is
known to have a value, denoted by vki ∈ R, which is equal to
the minimum over all strategies of MIN of the maximum over
all strategies of MAX of the payoff Jki of (1). In particular,
the value vector vk = (vki )1≤i≤n ∈ Rn satisfies the dynamic
programming recursion
v0 = 0 and vk+1 = T (vk). (3)
Note that, since all the action spaces are finite, the above
game can be transformed into a game with same behavior
and operator (2), but with action spaces independent of the
state and the selected action (by duplicating some transition
payments and probabilities). However, this would change the
space of transition payments hence most of our results.
We will study here the asymptotics of the value vector
as the horizon k of the game tends to infinity. In particular,
we are interested in the following quantity, called the mean
payoff vector (per time unit):
χ(T ) := lim
k→∞
vk/k = lim
k→∞
T k(0)/k . (4)
The mean payoff χ(T ) does exist when the action spaces
are finite. Indeed, Kohlberg [2] has shown that T has
then an invariant half-line, that is, there exist two vectors
x, ν ∈ Rn such that T (x + tν) = x + (t + 1)ν for every
scalar t large enough. It can be checked that χ(T ) = ν.
Note that the existence of the mean payoff vector is also
guaranteed more generally when T is semi-algebraic, see
Neyman [3]. Other conditions, in terms of the operator
(α, x) 7→ αT (1−α
α
x), α > 0, have been given by Rosenberg
and Sorin [4].
It is convenient to note that the limit limk→∞ T k(x)/k is
independent of the choice of x ∈ Rn. This follows readily
from the elementary fact that T is sup-norm nonexpansive.
B. Nonlinear spectral problem
The existence of the mean payoff vector is guaranteed if
we can find a vector u ∈ Rn and a scalar λ ∈ R solution of
the following nonlinear spectral problem,
T (u) = λ1+ u, (5)
where 1 is the unit vector of Rn.
Indeed, in such a situation, we have T k(u) = kλ + u,
for all k ≥ 0, and so, χ(T ) = λ1, meaning that the mean
payoff starting from state i, [χ(T )]i, is independent of the
initial state i, and equal to λ. The scalar λ will be called the
eigenvalue of T . It follows that the eigenvalue, if it exists, is
necessarily unique (for χ(T ) is uniquely defined). The vector
u, called bias vector or eigenvector, gives optimal stationary
strategies.
Since any Shapley operator (2) is additively homogeneous
(that is, commutes with the addition of a constant), a bias
vector is always defined up to an additive constant and it is
interesting to understand when such a vector is unique (up
to an additive constant).
For one player problems, i.e., for discrete optimal control,
the nonlinear eigenproblem (5) (also known as the ‘average
case optimality equation’) has been much studied, either in
the deterministic or in the stochastic case (Markov decision
problems). Then, the representation of bias vectors and their
relation with optimal strategies is well understood.
For the deterministic case, the analysis relies on max-
plus spectral theory, which goes back to the work of Ro-
manovski [5], Gondran and Minoux [6] and Cuninghame-
Green [7]. In [8], [9], [10] can be found more background
on max-plus spectral theory. Kontorer and Yakovenko [11],
and Kolokoltsov and Maslov [12], deal specially with infinite
horizon optimization and mean payoff problems. The set
of bias vectors has the structure of a max-plus (tropical)
cone, i.e., it is invariant by max-plus linear combinations,
and it has a unique minimal generating family consisting
of certain ‘extreme’ generators, which can be identified
by looking at the support of the maximizing measures in
the linear programming formulation of the optimal control
problem, or at the “recurrence points” of infinite optimal
trajectories. We refer the reader to [13] and to the references
therein for more information on max-plus spectral theory. A
combinatorial interpretation of some of these results, in terms
of polyhedral fans, has been recently given by Sturmfels
and Tran [14]. The eigenproblem has also been studied for
an infinite dimensional state space in the context of infinite
dimensional max-plus spectral theory, see Akian, Gaubert
and Walsh [15], and also in the setting of weak KAM theory,
for which we refer the reader to the book of Fathi [16]. In
the stochastic case, the structure of the set of bias vectors is
still known, at least when the state space is finite, see Akian
and Gaubert [17].
In the two player case, the structure of the set of bias
vectors u ∈ Rn is less well known, although the description
of this set remains a fundamental issue. In particular, the
uniqueness of the bias vector (up to an additive constant)
is an important matter for algorithmic purposes. Indeed,
the nonuniqueness of the bias typically leads to numeri-
cal unstabilities or degeneracies. In particular, the standard
Hoffman and Karp policy iteration algorithm [18] may fail
to converge in situations in which the bias vector is not
unique. Some refinements of the Hoffman and Karp scheme
have been proposed by Cochet-Terrasson and Gaubert [19],
Akian, Cochet-Terrasson, Detournay and Gaubert [20], and
Bourque and Raghavan [21], allowing one to circumvent
such degeneracies at the price of a complexification of the
algorithm (handling the non-uniqueness of the bias). Hence,
it is of interest to understand when such technicalities can
be avoided.
Moreover, generally, the existence of the bias vector is
controlled by some ergodicity conditions. A general result
in [22] relates the existence of the bias vector of a Shapley
operator with the uniqueness of the bias vector of an auxiliary
(simpler) Shapley operator, called recession function. This
provides further motivation to study the uniqueness problem
for the bias vector.
C. Main results
We deal with two problems concerning zero-sum para-
metric stochastic games, that is, games whose parameters
(transition payments and probabilities) vary.
We first look for conditions involving the transition prob-
abilities which guarantee that the nonlinear eigenproblem is
solvable for all values of the transition payments. Our first
main result, Theorem 5, shows that this property is structural,
meaning that it only depends on the support of the transition
probabilities (not on their values).
Then, we address the question of the uniqueness of the
bias vector, restricting our attention to games for which the
previous structural property holds. Our second main result,
Theorem 10, shows that the bias vector is generically unique
(up to an additive constant). More precisely, we show that
the set of transition payments for which the bias vector is
not unique belongs to a polyhedral fan the cells of which
have codimension one at least. A first ingredient in the
proof is the max-plus spectral theorem, in the deterministic
case, and its extension to the stochastic case [17]. A second
ingredient is a general result, showing that the set of fixed
points of a nonexpansive self-map of Rn is a retract of Rn,
see Theorem ??. This allows us to infer the uniqueness of
the bias vector of a Shapley operator from the uniqueness of
the bias vector of the reduced Shapley operators obtained by
fixing the strategy of one player.
Finally, as a simple application of our results, we show
that the standard Hoffman and Karp policy iteration for
two player games does terminate for generic well posed
instances.
Let us note that although the finiteness of action spaces
is assumed throughout the paper, the results in Section II
remain true with compact action spaces (and some additional
assumptions on the transition payments and probabilities,
see [23]). In particular, they are true for repeated games with
imperfect information (where players select an action simul-
taneously). However, the techniques used to prove the results
in Section III are strongly related with the finiteness of action
spaces. Therefore, they cannot go through Assumption A and
the perfect information assumption.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we show
the structural existence result for the bias vector. This partly
relies on recent results established by the authors in a com-
panion work [23], that we first recall. The generic uniqueness
of the bias vector is established in Section III, using results of
max-plus spectral theory and nonlinear spectral theory. The
application to policy iteration is presented in Section IV.
II. STRUCTURAL PROPERTIES FOR THE EXISTENCE OF AN
EIGENVALUE
A. Necessary and sufficient condition of existence of an
eigenvalue
Recall that, Rn being endowed with its usual partial order,
the map T : Rn → Rn is said to be monotone and additively
homogeneous if it satisfies the following properties, respec-
tively,
• x ≤ y ⇒ T (x) ≤ T (y), x, y ∈ Rn,
• T (x+ λ1) = T (x) + λ1, x ∈ Rn, λ ∈ R.
In [22], Gaubert and Gunawardena have given a sufficient
condition for a monotone and additively homogeneous oper-
ator T on Rn to have an eigenvalue. This condition involves
the recession function of T , denoted by Tˆ and defined on
R
n by
Tˆ (x) := lim
α→+∞
T (αx)
α
.
For a general operator, the recession function may not exist.
However, if T is a Shapley operator (2) satisfying Assump-
tion A (finite state and action spaces), then the recession
function is well defined everywhere and given by
[Tˆ (x)]i = min
a∈Ai
max
b∈Bi,a
P abi x, ∀i ∈ S. (6)
Remark 1: If the recession function Tˆ of T exists, then it
is also monotone and additively homogeneous. Furthermore,
it is positively homogeneous, meaning that
• Tˆ (λx) = λTˆ (x), x ∈ Rn, λ > 0.
As a consequence, any vector proportional to 1 is a fixed
point of Tˆ .
Theorem 2 ([22]): Let T : Rn → Rn be a monotone
and additively homogeneous operator. Suppose its recession
function is well defined on Rn and has only trivial fixed
points (that is, fixed point proportional to 1). Then T has an
eigenvalue, meaning that Equation (5) is solvable for T .
Conversely, if F is a monotone, additively and positively
homogeneous operator on Rn and if ν is one of its fixed
points, then the operator T : x 7→ F (x) + ν is monotone,
additively homogeneous and satisfies Tˆ = F and χ(T ) =
ν. In particular, if ν is nontrivial, then T cannot have any
eigenvalue. This leads to the following theorem.
Theorem 3: Let T be a Shapley operator (2) with finite
state and action spaces (Assumption A). Then the following
properties are equivalent:
i) T has an eigenvalue for all values of the transition
payments rabi ,
ii) the recession function of T (6) has only trivial fixed
points.
Remark 4: The special case of Theorem 3 restrained to
min-max functions (which corresponds to Shapley operators
of deterministic games) has been addressed by Zhao, Zheng
and Zhu [24]. In this case, the condition on the recession
function can be reduced to a fixed point problem for a
Boolean function (defined on the set {0, 1}n of Boolean
vectors), hence a purely combinatorial problem.
B. The condition of existence of an eigenvalue is structural
1) Statement of the result: In the following section, we
shall consider operators (2) that have an eigenvalue for all
values of the transition payments. According to Theorem 3,
these are characterized by the property that the operator given
by (6) has only trivial fixed points.
Fixed point problems related with such operators (6),
which we call payment-free Shapley operators, have been
studied in our companion work [23]. Our first main result is
the following.
Theorem 5: Whether a given payment-free Shapley oper-
ator (6) has only trivial fixed points depends only on the
support of the transition probabilities.
Recall that the support of a probability P ∈ ∆(S) is
the subset defined as {j ∈ S | Pj 6= 0}. In other words,
changing the probabilities P abi , while leaving invariant the
set of (i, j, a, b) such that P abij 6= 0 does not change the
existence of a non-trivial fixed point of the operator Tˆ in (6).
We next recall some constructions and results that we use
to establish Theorem 5.
2) Galois connection between invariant faces of [0, 1]n:
Let F : Rn → Rn be a payment-free Shapley operator. If
u is a fixed point of F then, denoting I := argminu and
J := argmax u, we can show that
F (1S\I) ≤ 1S\I and 1J ≤ F (1J), (7)
where 1K , with K ⊂ S, is the vector with entries 1 on K
and 0 on S \K.
Let F− (resp. F+) be the family of subsets of S verifying
the first (resp. the second) inequality in (7):
F− :=
{
I ⊂ S | F (1S\I) ≤ 1S\I
}
,
F+ :=
{
J ⊂ S | 1J ≤ F (1J)
}
.
The elements of F− and F+ can be visualized as faces of
the hypercube [0, 1]n that are invariant by F .
The families F− and F+ are nonempty lattices of subsets
(they both contain ∅ and S). We define a Galois connection
(see [25] for the definition) between them, denoted by
(Φ,Φ⋆), in the following way: to I ∈ F− we associate the
greatest element J ∈ F+ which has an empty intersection
with I , and vice versa. Formally we have, for I ∈ F− and
J ∈ F+,
Φ(I) :=
⋃
J∈F+:I∩J=∅
J and Φ⋆(J) :=
⋃
I∈F−:I∩J=∅
I. (8)
If I ∈ F−, we denote by I¯ := Φ⋆ ◦ Φ(I) its closure by the
Galois connection (likewise, J¯ is the closure of J ∈ F+).
The following results explain why this Galois connection
is useful for the problem of existence of nontrivial fixed
points.
Theorem 6 ([23]): Let F be a payment-free Shapley op-
erator and I ∈ F−.
i) If Φ(I) = ∅, then F has no nontrivial fixed point u
such that argmin u = I .
ii) If I 6= ∅ and I = I¯ , then F has a fixed point u
satisfying argmin u = I .
Corollary 7: A payment-free Shapley operator has a non-
trivial fixed point if and only if there is a nontrivial subset
I ∈ F− closed for the Galois connection (Φ,Φ⋆), that is a
set I ∈ F− \ {∅, S} such that I = I¯ .
3) Boolean abstractions of Shapley operators: Let F be
a payment-free Shapley operator. We call upper and lower
Boolean abstractions of F the operators defined on the set
of Boolean vectors {0, 1}n, given respectively by
[F+(x)]i := min
a∈Ai
max
b∈Bi,a
max
j:Pab
ij
>0
xj ,
[F−(x)]i := min
a∈Ai
max
b∈Bi,a
min
j:Pab
ij
>0
xj ,
for every i ∈ S. Note that these operators depend only on
the support of the transition probabilities.
They suffice to characterize the families F− and F+, as
shown by the following lemma.
Lemma 8 ([23]): Let F be a payment-free Shapley oper-
ator and let I, J ⊂ S. Thenn
I ∈ F− ⇔ F+(1S\I) ≤ 1S\I ,
J ∈ F+ ⇔ F−(1J ) ≥ 1J .
Corollary 9: Given a payment-free Shapley operator, the
families F− and F+ and the Galois connection (Φ,Φ⋆)
are uniquely determined by the supports of the transition
probabilities.
III. GENERIC UNIQUENESS OF THE BIAS VECTOR OF
ZERO-SUM GAMES
A. The setting
We fix the state space, the action spaces and the transition
probabilities and consider parametric Shapley operators (2),
that is, operators whose transition payments (thought of as
parameters) can vary. In particular, we denote by R the
space of transition payments, whose elements are the finite
collections of reals
(
rabi
)
(i,a,b)
for the (i, a, b) ∈ S ×A×B
such that a ∈ Ai and b ∈ Bi,a. This set can be identified
with the Euclidean space Rq for a certain integer q. For a
given r ∈ R, we denote by Tr the corresponding Shapley
operator as defined in (2).
In this section we assume that the eigenproblem (5) is
solvable for all the values r ∈ R of the transition payments.
For any Shapley operator T as defined in (2), we denote by
E(T ) the set of its eigenvectors, and we say that T has a
unique eigenvector (up to an additive constant) if E(T ) is
reduced to a line (which is invariant by the addition of a
constant).
Before stating the main result of this section, we recall that
a polyhedral fan in Rq is a polyhedral complex consisting of
polyhedral cones, that is, a finite set K of polyhedral cones
such that
• P ∈ K and F is a face of P implies that F ∈ K,
• for all P,Q ∈ K, P ∩Q is a face of P and Q.
We refer to the textbook [26] for background on polyhedral
complexes and fans (but be aware that in this book a
polyhedral complex is not necessarily finite).
Theorem 10: Assume that for any transition payment r ∈
R, the Shapley operator Tr has an eigenvalue. Then the
space R is covered by a polyhedral fan such that for each
r in the interior of a full-dimensional cone, Tr has a unique
eigenvector.
Note that Theorem 10 implies that the transition payments
r ∈ R for which Tr has more that one eigenvector (up to an
additive constant) are situated in the finite union of subspaces
of codimension 1.
We prove Theorem 10 in the framework of both deter-
ministic and stochastic games. The structure of the proofs
are similar but they rely on different theories, which we find
interesting to present, although deterministic games can be
seen as a particular case of stochastic games. These theories
are max-plus algebra and nonlinear Perron-Frobenius theory,
respectively.
However, in both cases we infer from the following result
a fundamental property about the geometry of the set of
eigenvectors.
Theorem 11 ([27]): Let C be a closed convex subset of
a finite dimensional Banach space. Let T : C → C be a
nonexpansive map with respect to the norm of the Banach
space. Then the fixed point set of T is a nonexpansive
retract of C, meaning that it is the image of a nonexpansive
projection of C.
Corollary 12: Let T : Rn → Rn be an monotone and
additively homogeneous map (hence nonexpansive in the
sup-norm). Suppose Equation (5) is solvable. Then E(T ) is
a retract of Rn by a nonexpansive map. In particular, E(T )
is arcwise connected.
B. Deterministic case
In the deterministic case, each transition probability P abi
has only one state in its support. Thus, for r ∈ R, the
operator Tr in (2) can be written as
[Tr(x)]i = min
a∈Ai
max
1≤j≤n
(
r˜aij + xj
)
, (9)
where r˜aij = max{rabi | b ∈ Bi,a, P abij = 1} with the con-
vention that max ∅ = −∞. Moreover, the set Ci,a := {j ∈
S | r˜aij ∈ R} depends only on the transition probabilities,
hence is independent of the value of the payments.
The above representation (9) can be simplified using max-
plus notations. For this purpose, we introduce the max-plus
semiring Rmax := R ∪ {−∞}, which is a commutative
idempotent semiring with addition x ⊕ y = max(x, y) and
multiplication x⊗ y = x+ y. The zero and unit elements of
Rmax are −∞ and 0, respectively.
Let Σ be the (finite) set of policies of player MIN, that is,
the maps σ : S → A, i 7→ σ(i) ∈ Ai. If Rn is endowed with
its usual partial order then, for r ∈ R, the operator Tr can
be written as
Tr(x) = min
σ∈Σ
Mσr x, (10)
where Mσr ∈ Rn×nmax is a max-plus matrix (that is a n ×
n matrix over the max-plus semiring Rmax) and Mσr x is
to understand in the max-plus sense. Precisely, we have
[Mσr ]ij = r˜
σ(i)
ij . Note that (10) means that, for every x ∈ Rn,
we have Tr(x) ≤ Mσr x for all σ ∈ Σ, and there is σ ∈ Σ
such that Tr(x) = Mσr x. In particular, if λ is the eigenvalue
of Tr and u is an eigenvector, then there is a policy σ such
that Mσr u = λ1+ u.
1) Max-plus algebra: We now present some results on
max-plus matrices that can be found in [9, Chapter 3] or [13].
We draw the attention to the fact that vectors in Rnmax are
allowed to have entries equal to −∞.
Let M ∈ Rn×nmax with no row identically equal to −∞. We
need the following definitions.
Definition 13: The precedence graph of M , denoted by
G(M), is the weighted directed graph with set of nodes S
and an arc from i to j if Mij 6= −∞, in which case the
weight of the arc is the real number Mij .
Definition 14: The maximal circuit mean, ρ(M), is the
maximum average weight of the elementary circuits of G(M)
(the circuits where every nodes are distinct, except the
starting and the ending one).
Theorem 15 ([9, Rem. 3.24]): Let M ∈ Rn×nmax with no
row identically equal to −∞. Then, there exists u ∈ Rnmax,
with at least one finite entry, such that Mu = ρ(M)1+ u.
The vocabulary is the same as for the eigenproblem (5):
we say that u is a tropical eigenvector of M associated with
the tropical eigenvalue ρ(M).
Definition 16: The critical graph of M , denoted by
Gc(M), is the subgraph of G(M) consisting of all the
elementary circuits with average weight equal to ρ(M). A
critical class of M is a connected component of Gc(M).
Theorem 17 ([9, Thm. 3.101]): Let M ∈ Rn×nmax with no
row identically equal to −∞. Denote by Emax(M) the set of
tropical eigenvectors of M associated with the eigenvalue
ρ(M). Then, Emax(M) is tropically generated by a finite
family of vectors in Rnmax. Moreover, the least cardinality
of a generating family of Emax(M) is equal to the number
of critical classes of M .
Theorem 18: Let M ∈ Rn×nmax and λ ∈ R. If there is a
vector u ∈ Rn such that Mu = λ1+ u, then λ = ρ(M).
2) Sketch of proof of Theorem 10: By definition of R, for
every σ, the matrices Mσr have the same precedence graph
for all transition payments r ∈ R: there is an arc from i to j
if j ∈ Ci,σ(i). Then, for every σ, we can define the piecewise
linear function that maps an element r ∈ R to the maximal
circuit mean of Mσr , ρ(Mrrσ), and consider the polyhedral
fan Cσ associated with the cone of linearity of this function.
To each cone of linearity with full dimension corresponds a
unique critical circuit in G(Mσr ) (where r is any transition
payment).
We consider then the polyhedral fan C obtained as the
intersection of all the fans Cσ. We show that for each
element r ∈ R in the interior of a full-dimensional cone
of C, an eigenvector of Tr is also a tropical eigenvector
of a certain Mσr , associated with the eigenvalue ρ(Mσr ),
and whose tropical eigenvector is unique (up to an additive
constant). This shows that the eigenspace E(Tr) contains a
finite number of elements up to the addition of constants.
The conclusion follows from Theorem 12.
C. Stochastic case
We go back to the general framework presented in Sec-
tion III-A. Recall that Σ is the set of policies of player MIN.
For all σ ∈ Σ, we define Πσ as the set of policies of player
MAX, when the policy of MIN is fixed to σ, that is the maps
pi : S → B, i 7→ pi(i) ∈ Bi,σ(i). Moreover, given σ ∈ Σ and
r ∈ R, we define the operator T σr : Rn → Rn by
[T σr (x)]i = max
b∈Bi,σ(i)
(
r
σ(i)b
i + P
σ(i)b
i x
)
,
for all i ∈ S. Then, we have (Rn being endowed with its
usual partial order)
Tr(x) = min
σ∈Σ
T σr (x). (11)
Likewise, given σ ∈ Σ, we have
T σr (x) = max
π∈Πσ
(
rσπ + P σπx
)
, (12)
where rσπ is the vector in Rn whose i-th entry is defined
by rσπi = r
σ(i)π(i)
i and P σπ is the n × n stochastic matrix
whose i-th row is given by P σπi = P
σ(i)π(i)
i .
To prove Theorem 10, we need to state some results on
operators of type (12), which are piecewise affine, convex
(componentwise), monotone and additively homogeneous.
1) Ergodic stochastic control: Firstly, we characterize
the eigenvalue of a componentwise convex operator T σ as
defined in (12).
Lemma 19: Let T σ be an operator of type (12). For every
pi ∈ Πσ , let mσπC be the invariant measure associated with
the final class C of the stochastic matrix P σπ. Denote by
Fσπ the set of final classes of P σπ. Suppose that T σ has an
eigenvalue and denote it by λ. Then,
λ = max
π∈Πσ, C∈Fσπ
〈mσπC , r
σπ〉.
Secondly, we characterize the set of eigenvectors of the
operator T σ. For that, we need few definitions that are
detailed in [17]. For a map F : Rn → Rn, componentwise
convex, the notion of subdifferential is generalized by setting,
for x ∈ Rn, ∂F (x) = {P ∈ Rn×n | P (y − x) ≤
F (y) − F (x), ∀y ∈ Rn}. If F is monotone and additively
homogeneous, it can be shown that ∂F (x) is a convex set
of stochastic matrices. Suppose that F has an eigenvector
u. Then the critical graph of F , denoted by Gc(F ), is the
directed graph defined as the union of the final graphs of the
stochastic matrices P ∈ ∂F (u). This graph does not depend
on the choice of the eigenvector u. A critical node of F is a
node of Gc(F ) and a critical class of F is the set of nodes
of a strongly connected component of Gc(F ).
Theorem 20 ([17, Thm 1.1]): Let F : Rn → Rn be a
convex, monotone and additively homogeneous map. Sup-
pose that F has an eigenvector and denote by C the set of
its critical nodes. Then, (i) the restriction r : Rn → RC , x 7→
(xi)i∈C is an isomorphism from E(F ) to its image Ec(F );
(ii) Ec(F ) is a convex set whose dimension is at most equal
to the number of critical classes of F , and this bound is
attained when F is piecewise affine.
2) Sketch of proof of Theorem 10: Let r ∈ R. For
every σ, the operaor T σr is convex, monotone and additively
homogeneous. Then, for every σ, we can define the piecewise
linear map ρσ : r ∈ R 7→ maxπ∈Πσ, C∈Fσπ〈mσπC , rσπ〉,
where, for pi ∈ Πσ , mσπC is the invariant measure associated
with the final class C of the stochastic matrix P σπ. We
consider the polyhedral fan Cσ associated with the cone of
linearity of the map ρσ . To each cone of linearity with full
dimension corresponds a unique final class C.
We consider then the polyhedral fan C obtained as the
smallest refinement of all the fans Cσ. We show that for each
transition payment r in the interior of a full-dimensional cone
of C, an eigenvector u of Tr is also an eigenvector of a certain
T σr with a unique critical class, hence a unique eigenvector
(up to an additive constant). This shows that the eigenspace
E(Tr) contains a finite number of elements up to the addition
of constants. The conclusion follows from Theorem 12.
IV. APPLICATION TO POLICY ITERATION
Let us use the notations of Section III-C. In particular, Σ
is the (finite) set of policies of player MIN, that is the maps
σ : S → A, i 7→ σ(i) ∈ Ai, Π
σ is the (finite) set of policies
of player MAX when the policy of MIN, σ ∈ Σ, is fixed,
that is the set of maps pi : S → B, i 7→ pi(i) ∈ Bi,σ(i), and
for all σ ∈ Σ, pi ∈ Πσ , P σπ is the n× n stochastic matrix
whose ith row is given by P σπi = P
σ(i)π(i)
i .
When T is a Shapley operator (2) with finite state and
action spaces (Assumption A) such that all the stochastic
matrices P στ are irreducible, Hoffman and Karp [18] in-
troduced the following algorithm with input T and output
an eigenvalue λ and a bias vector u of T . Then optimal
stationary policies for both players can be computed.
Algorithm 21 ([18]): Select an arbitrary policy σ0 ∈ Σ of
player MIN, then apply successively the two following steps
for k ≥ 0, until σk+1 = σk :
i) Compute the eigenvalue λk and the bias vk of the game
with fixed policy σk of player MIN, that is the solutions
λ and v of λ1+ v = T σk(v);
ii) Improve the policy: choose an optimal policy for vk,
that is σk+1 ∈ Σ such that T (vk) = T σk+1(vk), with
σk+1 = σk as soon as this is possible.
Return λk and vk.
In the above algorithm, Step i) is solved by using the same
policy iteration for the (one-player) game with fixed policy
σk, which constructs λk,ℓ, vk,ℓ and pik,ℓ from some pik,0.
One can show that the sequence λk of Algorithm 21 is
nonincreasing (λk+1 ≤ λk), and that when λk+1 = λk, then
vk+1 = vk (up to an additive constant) and σk+1 = σk.
Hence, the algorithm terminates after a finite number of
steps, for the set of policies Σ is finite.
When the stochastic matrices P στ are not irreducible, the
existence of λk and vk may fails in Step i) of Algorithm 21.
Moreover, even if λk and vk can be constructed at each step
k, the nonuniqueness of vk (up to an additive constant) may
lead to a cycling of the sequence vk in Algorithm 21, as
shown for instance in [20, Section 6]. In the general case,
one need first to replace eigenvectors by invariant half-lines
to avoid problems of existence and second to apply a special
treatment of degeneracies (when the eigenvalue or mean
payoff vector does not change from one step to another and
the bias vector or invariant half-line is not unique) as in [19],
[20], [21] to avoid cycling of the algorithm.
Using the arguments of Section III-C, we obtain the
following result, under the same setting as for Theorem 10,
that is fixing the state space, the action spaces and the
transition probabilities and considering parametric Shapley
operators (2).
Theorem 22: The space R is covered by a polyhedral fan
such that for each transition payment r in the interior of a
full-dimensional cone, if Algorithm 21 is well posed, that is
if at each step k of the algorithm, the operator T σkr has an
eigenvalue, then it terminates after a finite number of steps
and gives an eigenvalue λ and a bias vector u of Tr.
Sketch of proof: Considering the same fan C as in Sec-
tion III-C, we get that for each r in the interior of a full-
dimensional cone of C, and for each σ ∈ Σ, if the operator
T σr has an eigenvector u, then this eigenvector is unique (up
to an additive constant). This implies that, if at each step k of
the algorithm, the operator T σkr has an eigenvalue λk, then
the bias vector vk is unique up to an additive constant. One
can always show (without any assumption) that the sequence
λk is nonincreasing (λk+1 ≤ λk). Then, using the uniqueness
of bias vectors, we deduce from Lemma 3.3 of [17], that if
λk+1 = λk, then up to an additive constant, vk+1 ≤ vk with
equality on the set of critical nodes of T σkr . This implies that
the sequence vk coincides up to an additive constant with the
sequence obtained in the algorithm introduced in [19] and
developed in [20]. Then, the convergence of Algorithm 21
in a finite number of steps follows from the convergence of
the algorithm of [19], [20].
V. EXAMPLE
Consider the following parametric Shapley operator de-
fined on R3 (here we use ∧ and ∨ instead of min and max,
respectively, and we recall that + has precedence over them):
Tr(x) =
(
r1 +
1
2
(x1 + x3) ∧ r2 +
1
2
(x1 + x2)
r3 +
1
2
(x1 + x3) ∧
(
r4 +
1
2
(x1 + x2) ∨ r5 + x3
)
r6 +
1
2
(x1 + x3) ∨ r7 + x3
)
with r ∈ R7. Its recession function is
Tˆr(x) =
(
1
2
(x1 + x3) ∧
1
2
(x1 + x2)
1
2
(x1 + x3) ∧
(
1
2
(x1 + x2) ∨ x3
)
1
2
(x1 + x3) ∨ x3
)
and it can be checked that it has only trivial fixed points.
Hence, according to Theorem 3, Equation (5) is solvable for
every r ∈ R7. Alternatively, we may consider the Galois
connection between the families F− =
{
∅, {1, 3}, {1, 2, 3}
}
and F+ =
{
∅, {3}, {1, 2, 3}
}
as defined in II-B.2. We verify
that the only nontrivial element of F− is not closed with
respect to this Galois connection (since Φ⋆ ◦ Φ({1, 3}) =
Φ⋆(∅) = {1, 2, 3}), which leads to the same conclusion
according to Corollary 7.
We now fix r = r0 = (0, 1, 2, 1,−2,−3, 1) and denote by
T0 the corresponding operator. We consider the perturbations
of r0 that depend only on the state i.e., in the space
of payments R7, we consider the affine subspace A0 =
{r0 + (g1, g1, g2, g2, g2, g3, g3) | g ∈ R3}, corresponding
to the operators T0 + g with g ∈ R3 (note that by additive
homogeneity of Tr, we may assume w.l.o.g. that g3 = 0).
Figure 1 shows the polyhedral complex obtained as the
intersection between the polyhedral fan of Theorem 10 and
the affine subspace A0. Here for each g in the interior of a
full-dimensional polyhedron, T0+g has a unique eigenvector
(up to an additive constant). Let us detail what happens in
the neighborhood of g = 0, point in which T0 + g fails to
have a unique eigenvector. Note that in the neighborhood of
g = 0, the eigenvalue of T0 + g remains 1.
g1
10
g2
−10
g3 = 0
•
0
Fig. 1.
If g1 + g2 = 0, the eigenvectors
of T0 + g are defined by x1 =
x2+2g1 and −3+g2 ≤ x2−x3 ≤
−2− g1.
If g1+ g2 > 0, the unique eigen-
vector (up to an additive con-
stant) is (−2 + 2g1,−2 + 2g1 +
2g2, 0).
If g1+ g2 < 0, the unique eigen-
vector is (−3 + 2g1 + g2,−3 +
g2, 0).
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